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TELEVISION AND TERRORISM:
PROFESSIONALISM NOT QUITE THE ANSWER
HERBERT A. TERRY*
The first quarter of 1977 was more than usually challenging for a small
number of television journalists. The challenge came in deciding how to cover
a series of domestic terrorism-hostage incidents with relatively new television
newsgathering equipment permitting those incidents to be covered in real
time and with greater ease than previously possible. Problems started on
February 8 when Anthony Kiritsis, a small-time Indianapolis land developer,
took mortgage company president Richard Hall hostage for 63 hours. The
Kiritsis episode ended February 10 with a rambling, obscenity-filled press
conference-a shotgun still attached to Hall's neck-prior to the hostage's
release. Indianapolis TV stations covered the conference live; excerpts of that
coverage appeared on all three networks.
On Valentine's day, Frederick Cowan held captives briefly in a New
Rochelle, New York factory and then committed suicide. On March 7, Cory
Moore took two captives, a young woman and a police captain, in the
Cleveland suburb of Warrensville Heights. They were released two days later
only after President Carter promised to give Moore a phone call. On the date
of that call, March 9, members of the Hanafi Muslim sect invaded three
Washington D.C. buildings. They took 134 hostages and held them through
March 11. In all of these instances, TV coverage-by both local stations and
major TV networks-was extensive. Not surprisingly, such intensive coverage
of two months of terrorism stirred up old controversies about how broad-
casting, especially television, should treat hostage-taking, terrorism and civil
disturbance.'
*Assistant Professor, Department of Telecommunications, Indiana University.
'It is difficult to formulate a good operational or conceptual definition of what is meant
here by terrorism-hostage taking incidents. The primary concern here is with terrorists who
become hostage takers, for it was the taking of hostages that made many of these incidents too
newsworthy for media personnel to ignore. The National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals, in 1976-1977, attempted to distinguish among terrorism, quasi-terrorism,
civil disorder, political terrorism, nonpolitical terrorism, and official or state terrorism. NA.
TIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, DISORDERS AND TER-
RORISM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON DISORDERS AND TERRORISM (1976). Police psychologists.
and psychiatrists who work with police make distinctions among types of hostage-takers: the in-
sane, those who end up with hostages unintentially and those who take hostages deliberately and
with greater planning. Speech of Dr. Herbert Modin, Professor of Community and Forensic
Psychiatry, Menninger Foundation, Topeka, Kan. to 7th Annual Meetong of Associated Press
Broadcasters, St. Louis, Mo. (June 3, 1977).
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Public controversy about such things is nothing new. In the 1960's, televi-
sion journalists were criticized for their coverage of airplane hijackings and
civil disorders associated with race relations and the Vietnam war. 2 The ma-
jor criticism was that overly extensive TV coverage encouraged-even
taught-further terrorism. By the time of the Kiritsis and Hanafi controver-
sies, it was obvious that similar public criticism was building again. A Gallup
Poll conducted March 25-28, 1977 found that a majority of those polled,
64%, believed that terrorist coverage incited more terrorist acts. Despite this
belief, however, opinion was rather evenly divided on whether media were
placing too much emphasis on terrorism coverage. Nationally, 47% thought
there was overemphasis, but 50% believed such reporting "necessary to keep
people fully informed."3 So, the public was concerned about the effects of
terrorist coverage, but divided about what to do about it. Just about the same
thing was true of broadcast journalism community.
Television's work in covering acts of terrorism is, by nature, highly visible
and readily subject to criticism. Shortly after the Hanafi Muslim siege, UN
Ambassador Andrew Young suggested that terrorism was contagious and that
"'a lot of these phenomena' are the result of publicity they are given. 'In a
sense, we're advertising to neurotic people' that the way to get attention is 'to
do something suicidal and ridiculous."' Young claimed that "this kind of
crime would not have been known about [in California, where he made these
remarks] when the first amendment was written. It should have died in
Washington, D.C." He then suggested that the first amendment "be 'clarified
by the Supreme Court in the light of the power of the mass media."' 4 Within
days President Carter disassociated himself from Young's position. According
to White House Press Secretary Jody Powell, the President:
recognizes the complexity of the problem and frankly has no easy solution in
mind. He sees this as a problem that should be addressed by the news media
as a powerful and responsible institution in our society. He has no desire to
seek legislation or to otherwise impose a solution and hopes those who make
news decisions will themselves determine the definite boundaries of legitimate
coverage.5
The President's plea for media self-regulation, rather than governmental
action to "clarify" the First Amendment or to enact some other legal solution
to the terrorism-hostage controversy, was the preferred solution to the pro-
2See COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CIVIL DISORDERS, 362-88 (1968).
3Gallup Poll: News of Terrorism Gets Good, Bad Views, Indianapolis Star, April 28, 1977,
at 37, col. 3. These views generally held true across normal demographic subgroups. Nonwhites,
however, had somewhat different opinions. Only 45% of nonwhites believed terrorism coverage
incited terrorism and far more than normal, 67% of nonwhites, believed terrorist coverage was
getting about the right attention.4Carter Takes Noninterventionist Stance in Debate over Coverage of Terrorists, BROAD-
CASTING March 21, 1977, at 28.
5Id.
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blem among most of the television journalism community. The U.S. media
have a long history of self-regulation, partly because while the First Amend-
ment is a powerful barrier to many governmental actions affecting the press,
it is not absolute. 6 As long ago as 1941, the Commission on Freedom of the
Press-originator of the so-called "social responsibility theory of the
press"-urged media organizations to police themselves, accept their social
responsibilities and engage in self-regulation, with a warning that failure to
do so might lead to more active governmental intervention to assure that
journalists met social needs.7 Broadcasting, a licensed medium, has more of a
history of direct governmental regulation than the print media but it, too,
has a substantial history of a self-regulation. The National Association of
Broadcasters (NAB) adopted a Code of Ethics in the prehistory of radio,
1929.8 The Radio-Television News Directors Association (RTNDA) pro-
mulgated a "Code of Broadcast News Ethics" in 1966. 9 As is true of many
self-regulatory codes, however, a major purpose of many provisions of these
codes in broadcasting has been to ward off threatened or probable direct
governmental regulation.' 0 With powerful politicians at the federal and state
level talking about changes in the law to deal with terrorism-hostage
coverage, it was to be expected that industry leaders would press instead for
self-regulation. That may be the most desirable eventual course of social ac-
tion, but if chosen, it should be chosen on sound grounds. The argument
over self-regulation to deal with terrorism-hostage coverage, however, became
repeatedly intertwined with claims by journalists that it was the appropriate
response because of their professionalism. There are however-as will be
shown shortly-sociological and legal reasons for not deferring more direct
governmental action on that particular basis.
THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF RECENT TERRORIST INCIDENTS
Before discussing professionalism further, however, it is vital to under-
stand why terrorism-hostage coverage in early 1977 posed new problems to
'New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931).
7See COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS: A GENERAL
REPORT ON MASS COMMUNICATIONS, NEWSPAPERS. RADIO. MOTION PICTURES, MAGAZINES AND
BoOKS (1941).
'Reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 326 (2d ed. F. Kahn 1973).
9Id. at 493.
"oSee S. HEAD. BROADCASTING IN AMERICA 432 (3d ed. 1976). Judge Warren Ferguson of the
Central District of California reached a similar conclusion about the motive for the NAB's adop-
tion of the "Family Viewing" provision of the NAB Code. Concluding that the FCC had
threatened the NAB into adopting this provision against its will, and also concluding that a self-
regulatory system enforced by the NAB undercut the legal responsibility of individual broad-
casters for their choice of programming, Judge Ferguson found that the Communications Act of
1934, the Administrative Procedure Act and the first amendment had all been violated. The case
is presently on appeal in the 9th Circuit. Writers Guild v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal.
1976). But see Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 40 RAD. REG. 2d 1577 (P & F) (D.C. Cir.
1977).
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TV journalists, since there had been some previous TV coverage of terrorist
activities. U.S. media had covered foreign terrorism, often involving hostages,
for years; the massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympic
Games, bombings in London, Belfast and Dublin associated with the religious
warfare of Northern Ireland and, of course, the many acts of terrorism
associated with disorder in the Middle East." Media behavior here was fre-
quently criticized, as was coverage of the war in Vietnam, a war one critic
called "the living-room war."' 2 There was something different about the
events of early 1977, however. Basically it was that news coverage of those
events was in two ways more immediate than previous reportage.
One respect in which coverage was more immediate was spacial:
terrorism-hostage taking was taking place close to home. There were, of
course, previous incidents of domestic U.S. terrorism and hostage taking prior
to 1977, but the closely compacted events in Indianapolis, Washington D.C.
and elsewhere in February and March of that year suggested that the living-
room war might be going domestic. Native dissidents, malcontents, crackpots
and criminals seemed to have learned some lessons from international models.
A spectacular example of this coming home of political terrorism tactics in-
volving hostages-and one of the first great challenges on TV coverage of
such things-came in 1973 and 1974 with the abduction of Patty Hearst. The
kidnapping of Hearst, granddaughter of "the" William Randolph Hearst, was
naturally a "media event" from the start. Audio tapes were sent by the ab-
ductors to radio stations, their manifestos printed in newspapers. Television
stations ran films which appeared to show Ms. Hearst taking part in a bank
robbery. For months, law enforcement agencies seemed unable to capture
Hearst and her Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) comrades. Then, on May
17, 1974, the case turned into a classic case study of the problems faced by
TV journalists in covering domestic terrorism with contemporary broadcast
equipment.
On that date, police cornered members of the SLA in a small stucco
home in central Los Angeles. A shootout occurred; the home was set ablaze.
Desperate SLA members, some feared Patty herself, fought it out with police
until they eventually died in the burning home. The shootout-firefight-was
watched live by millions. KNXT, the CBS owned and operated station in Los
Angeles, originated live coverage, shared with two other network owned and
operated stations, KNBC and KABC, plus three VHF and two UHF indepen-
dent stations in Los Angeles.1 3 It was all possible because of the new
playthings of the broadcast industry, Electronic Newsgathering (ENG) equip-
ment.1 4
"See Hickey, Terrorism and Television, T.V. GUIDE, July 31, 1976, at 2; Hickey, The
Medium in the Middle, T.V. GUIDE, Aug. 7, 1976, at 10.
I2M. ARLEN. THE LIVING-RooM WAR (1969).
"
3How TV Stations Rise to the Occasion When Big News Breaks, BROADCASTING Aug. 19,
1974, at 42.
"4Saltzman, It's Live-and It's Terrifying, T.V. GUIDE, Mar. 15, 1975, at 6.
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Television had had the ability to do "remotes"-broadcasts from field
locations rather than the TV studios-for years. Remote trucks go back to
the late 1930's. Until the mid 1970's, however, a remote was a cumbersome
and necessarily pre-planned process. Equipment was bulky and costly to
operate, so remotes were reserved mostly for events that could be anticipated
in advance like political conventions and sports. It was not readily possible to
do remote coverage for fast-breaking news. For that, film was more ap-
propriate-but film took time to process and edit for television.
In about 1973, however, three new pieces of TV equipment moved from
the laboratory to production and revolutionalized TV journalism technology.
That revolution challenged existing TV ethics and practices. The equipment
was simple: (1) small, light video cameras ("minicams"), (2) light, battery-
powered video tape recorders and (3)-the real technological
breakthrough-a device called the time-base corrector which converted the
output of the light-weight video recorder into a picture with sufficient stabili-
ty to be broadcast. With just these three pieces of equipment, news coverage
could be speeded up substantially by eliminating the time for film processing.
With one more piece of equipment-a portable microwave transmitter and
receiver unit-images could be transmitted directly from field to studio and,
if desired, broadcast live. TV news had at last become as instantaneous with
images as radio had long been with sound.
In September, 1974 a CBS owned and operated station in St. Louis,
KMOX-TV, became the nation's first all ENG station. 5 Other network own-
ed stations followed, and were soon joined by larger stations not owned by
networks. The switch to new equipment was expensive, and it was clear that
first generation equipment would soon be outdated, but TV journalists were
anxious for the immediacy the equipment provided and the investments were
quickly made. 16 In 1973 and 1974, ENG was a game for the affluent. By ear-
ly 1977, however, over 75% of commercial TV broadcast stations had ENG
cameras and video recorders, although not all had the microwave equipment
needed for live transmission. 17 Further ENG growth can be expected: a survey
of station executives in early 1978 concerning immediate equipment purchase
plans found "a pretty clear pattern of interest in what appears to be a plan
for quick expansion of live ENG capability. Broadcasters across the country
quickly ticked off a selection of 'very interesteds' in ENG cameras, (95 per-
cent), microwave for ENG (71 percent), time base correctors (82 percent),
frame synchronizers (74 percent)." Before long, ENG should penetrate into
"Portable Cameras, VTR's Moving TV Journalism into New Age of immediacy, BROAD-
CASTING. Aug. 19, 1974, at 46.
"Big Changes in Local News; More Speed, More Depth, More Demands, BROADCASTING,
Aug. 19, 1974, at 87.7Stone & DiCioccio, Survey Compares Coverage by ENG and Newsfilm, RTNDA COM-
MUNICATOR, Jan. 1978, at 12.
"BM/B's Panels of 100 Survey Reveals the Industry's Areas of Greatest Interest in 1978,
BM/E, Feb. 1978, at 93-94.
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even the smallest of TV markets, making ethical and legal questions about its
use a matter of broad industry and social concern. The use of ENG in cover-
ing the events of early 1977 showed how complex and difficult the resolution
of those questions could be.
Two of the 1977 hostage-taking situations merit substantial discussion,
not just because of the TV coverage they received, but mainly because these
two incidents, more than others in the same time period, became the focus of
intensive study and criticism within the TV journalism community. These are
the Anthony Kiritsis case in Indianapolis and the Hanafi Muslim siege in
Washington, D.C.
The Kiritsis case started shortly after 8:00 a.m., February 8, 1977 when
Anthony G. (Tony) Kiritsis, 44, kidnapped Indianapolis mortgage company
executive Richard 0. Hall, 42, from Hall's downtown Indianapolis office.19
Kiritsis crudely attached a sawed-off shotgun to Hall's neck, rigged to go off
if Kiritsis was rushed, and marched the executive more than four blocks in
near-zero weather until he commandeered a police car and forced Hall to
drive to Kiritsis' allegedly booby-trapped apartment. The bizarre street scenes
were covered thoroughly, in some cases live, by TV and print camerapersons.
For the next 63 hours, Hall was held captive in the apartment. Later the
news director of one Indianapolis station reported that his station alone
broadcast 29 separate reports, many interrupting regular programming, dur-
ing Hall's captivity. 20 Kiritsis believed the mortgage company had cheated
and mislead him in connection with his efforts to develop a small shopping
center. Most of his demands related to forgiveness of a loan and apology by
the company. The company quickly granted a cautious apology-broadcast
on TV stations-and Kiritsis then began to bargain for immunity from state
and federal prosecution.
Immunity from state charges was offered by the Marion County Pro-
secutors' Office as early as the evening of February 9th, through a televised
statement, as well as in written form, to Kiritsis and his attorneys, but the
"The account that follows is drawn mainly from the following newspaper stories. City Ex-
ecutive Held Hostage, Indianapolis News, Feb. 8, 1977, at 1, col. 3; Police Await Next Demand,
Indianapolis News, Feb. 9, 1977, at 1, col. 4; 'Ive Been An Angry Man for 44 Years," In-
dianapolis News, Feb. 9, 1977, at 2, col. 1; Hostage Case Near Turning Point, Indianapolis
News, Feb. 10, 1977, at 1, col. 3; Radio Newsman Called to Command Trailer, Indianapolis
News, Feb. 10, 1977, at 1, col. 5; Former Roommate "Keeping Tony Cool", Indianapolis News,
Feb. 10, 1977, at 1, col. 3; Kiritsis Faces Legal Battle after Freeing His Hostage, Indianapolis
News, Feb. 11, 1977, at 1, col. 1; Never Intended to Honor Terms Indianapolis News, Feb. 12,
1977, at 1, col. 1; Gunman Refuses to Surrender, Indianapolis Star, Feb. 9, 1977, at 1, col. 5;
Full Immunity offered Gunman, Indianapolis Star, Feb. 10, 1977, at 1, col. 4; Hall Set Free
After 63 Hours, Cursing Gunman Under Arrest, Indianapolis Star, Feb. 11, 1977, at 1, col. 1;
Grim Mood in Ordeal's 60th Hour, Indianapolis Star, Feb. 11, 1977, at 1, col. 3; We Interrupt
This Program".'.. !%!%!, Indianapolis Star, Feb. 11, 1977, at 23, col. 4; 37 FACTS ON FILE 162
(March 5, 1977). Specific stories will be cited only upon direct quotation.
2GAudio tape of speech of Bob Gamble, News Director WRTV, at Annual Convention of
Radio-Television News Directors Association, San Francisco (Sept. 17, 1977).
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problem of possible federal charges was more difficult. Federal officials
repeatedly refused to promise immunity. Later, Attorney General Griffin Bell
would say that he would never make a false promise of immunity even to free
a hostage. At 7:35 p.m. on February 10th, however, Deputy Marion County
Prosecutor George Martz went on all Indianapolis network affiliates to an-
nounce that it was the prosecutors' belief that no federal laws had been
broken. Shortly after 10:00 p.m., to the surprise of police and media, Kiritsis
emerged with his hostage, the shotgun still attached to Hall's neck. Kiritsis
headed for the lobby of the apartment complex where police and media had
maintained a command center. There Tony conducted a rambling,
obscenity-filled press conference which domonstrated, as had many other
events throughout the affair, that in many ways, Indianapolis media were
about as much a captive as was Hall.2" One Indianapolis newspaper described
the wild scene vividly:
With a shotgun still taped to Hall's ear, Kiritsis went on television last night
to make further demands.
Hall stood by numbly in the glare of the television lights as Kiritsis laun-
ched into a wild tirade against Hall and Meridian Mortgage Company, which
had financed Kiritsis' purchase of a 17-acre Westside property.
Kiritsis in a rambling and incoherent speech repeated his long catalogue
of complaints against Meridian Mortgage. During the entire time, the gun
was pointed at Hall's head, jerking first to the left and then to the right.
The flushed Hall stood stone-faced, his lips compressed. His hands were
handcuffed in front of him.
Kiritsis was surrounded by 100 policemen and newsmen. Frequently he
called out for his brother, Jimmie.
Martz said: "We thought of everything but this." 22
"This" lasted for 23 minutes. It was carried, "live and in its entirety" by
two of three Indianapolis network affiliates. Kiritsis thought it was being car-
ried nationally, and tried during his remarks to make sure he was "on all
three" networks. As the Indianapolis Star noted with supreme understate-
ment, it was a performance that "defied comparison as a media event." 23
During the 23 minutes, Kiritsis vilified Hall and the mortgage company, hug-
ged and praised police and law enforcement officials for their handling of the
event, called himself a "God damned national hero," complained that some
TV coverage had been defamatory-"There are going to be some Goddam
retractions" -read a formal list of grievances against the company, praised
Fred Heckman, news director for radio station WIBC-with whom Kiritsis
had had several phone conversations-and asked viewers at home to send him
2
'For comment on this feeling, see Yount, An Open Letter to RTNDA on the Kiritsis Kid-
nap Coverage, RTNDA COMMUNICATOR, April, 1977, at 13.
22Hall Set Free After 63 Hours, Cursing Gunman Under Arrest, Indianapolis Star, Feb. 11,
1977, at 1, col. 1.
2'Gr'm Mood in Ordeal's 60th Hour, Indianapolis Star, Feb. 11, 1977, at 1, col. 3.
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postcards. Always there was the real possibility that he might pull the trigger,
treating Americans to a sight reminiscent of the assassination of Lee Harvey
Oswald in Dallas in 1963. In the midst of his praise of police and friends, one
onlooker remarked "watch out. He's saying good-bye to his friends and that
shotgun is probably going to go off."24 Near 11:00, however, Kiritsis and Hall
went to another room, negotiated briefly with police and, about 11:15, the
gun was removed from Hall's neck. Kiritsis was arrested, and police disclaim-
ed the immunity promise as being made under duress and of no value. Kirit-
sis was tried, but found not guilty by reason of insanity. 25 The jury was shown
video tapes of the press conference.
The episode attracted modest national media attention. Kiritsis' press
conference was not carried live on the networks, but between February 8 and
February 11, there was something on every network's evening news broadcast
every night about the Indianapolis affair.2 6 Over those four days, ABC gave
the story greatest play-a total of 7 minutes and 50 seconds. NBC was close
behind with 7 minutes, 30 seconds. CBS devoted only 5 minutes, 40 seconds
to the story. On February 11, all ran video excerpts from the press con-
ference, but edited that coverage. It was a different matter, of course, in In-
dianapolis where coverage was live.
Indianapolis broadcast media had been involved from the beginning. The
morning after the abduction-February 9th-Kiritsis telephoned Fred
Heckman of radio station WIBC at 6:22 a.m. to explain his case. Over the
next few days, Heckman had several phone conversations with the gunman
and eventually joined police to negotiate the final release. At the time,
Heckman deliberately ceased to function as a broadcast journalist-he even
refused to give information to newspersons working for him.27 Kiritsis was
heard both live and taped on WIBC. He monitored the station as well, for on
the night of Hall's release there was a moment of panic for police when Kirit-
sis misinterpreted a WIBC news report as indicating that the bomb squad was
about to rush the apartment. Within minutes, WIBC put Tony's brother on
the air to convince him that such was not the case.
In the later stages of the affair, however, it was mainly TV that became
the controversial broadcast medium. All three Indianapolis network affiliates
had live cameras available when Kiritsis began his tirade. At about 10:20
p.m. on February 10th, all three stations broke into network programming to
bring live coverage from the apartment complex. As an Indianapolis Star TV
t
"Long Ordeal Finally Ends with Harmless Gun Blast, Indianapolis News, Feb. 11, 1977, at
2, cal. 1.
5 Tony Kiritsis Found Not Guilty, Indianapolis Star, Oct. 22, 1977, at 1.
24A1i of the time computations reported about the national Kiritsis coverage are made from
TELEVISION News INDEX AND ABSTRACTs, 252, 254, 257, 262, 263, 270, 271, 273, 276, 278, 282,
286, 288, 292, 308 (Feb. 1977). The index is a publication of the Vanderbilt Television News Ar-
chive.
I Audio tape of speech of Fred Heckman, News Director WIBC, at Annual Convention of
Radio-Television News Directors Association, San Francisco, (Sept. 17, 1977).
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critic described, it "suddenly the air went blue in living color." 28 Two of the
stations, WISH (CBS) and WRTV (NBC) stayed with the conference from
beginning to end. The other station, WRHR (ABC) pulled away after about
5 minutes, apoligized for the language, announced that the material was not
suitable for broadcast, promised to keep viewers informed and returned to
The Streets of San Francisco. Later the General Manager of that station ex-
plained that for him it was a "problem of giving exposure to someone who is
distraught, or what have you ... we felt all he wanted was publicity ... At
one point, we felt he was going to pull that trigger."29 The News Director of
the same station explained "We bailed out . . .We would not go back until
the gun was down and there was no possibility of Hall being killed on the
air."5 0 The other Indianapolis affiliates considered the story so newsworthy
that it had to be covered despite the blue language and the risk of Hall's on-
air murder."3'
Although there had been controversial aspects of media coverage of the
event from its beginning, the coverage of the press conference became the
most controversial aspect of all and started a substantial discussion within the
TV journalism community about "proper" behavior in such situations. Wayne
Vriesman, then President of RTNDA, used his column in the March, 1977
issue of RTNDA's house organ-RTDNA Communicator-to suggest to his
members that they "set your guidelines now. Don't wait for the event to hap-
pen, because probably won't have time enough to give all the ramifications
proper consideration."32 The column noted that "we are going through a
predictable stage of growing pains with ENG where technology is interfering
with good news judgment . . .Let's keep news in proper perspective. With
the live capability now, it's very easy to fall into the overkill trap."33
Vriesman was more prophetic than he wished, for on March 9, 1977
another terrorist-hostage situation occurred that attracted greater national
media attention, probably because it involved more hostages, a quasi-political
motivation, and happened in Washington, D.C. At about 11:00 a.m.,
members of the Hanafi Muslim sect raided three Washington, D.C.
Buildings: the B'nai B'rith headquarters, the Islamic Center and the District
Building (city hall). Soon 134 persons were held hostage; they would be de-
tained for 39 hours. Broadcast coverage went full force:
"1"We Interrupt This Program"... !%!%!, Indianapolis Star, Feb. 11, 1977, at 23, col. 4.
29Id.
30Id. It is interesting to note that the event took place during a major television rating
period. Unfortunately, statistics are reported in such a way that it is not perfectly clear what hap-
pened to WRTV's rating when it pulled away from coverage. It appears, however, that
their decision had practically no effect in either shifting viewers to other stations or causing them
to "tune-out" to TV altogether. Ratings for the other stations during the Kiritsis news conference
remained about what they were for the entertainment programming that had been interrupted.
31id.
SZViesman, The Last Word..., RTNDA COMMUNICATOR, March 1977, at 16.
31d.
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[j]ournalists were coming in from across the nation and from foreign coun-
tries. NBC-TV assigned 18 minicam crews to the story. Like other networks,
it had the manpower and facilities from its Washington bureaus readily ac-
cessible. NBC used eight crews based in Washington, one from its own WRC-
TV there and brought in personnel and equipment from Chicago, New York
and Burbank, Calif. NBC Washington news director Ed Fouhy said about
100 NBC persons were assigned to the story but wouldn't estimate the costs of
the coverage. At WTOP-TV, Washington, news director Jim Snyder gave a
ballpark figure for his station's expenses at $70,000 - $75,000.34
Huge amounts of network prime-time newstime were spent on the Hanafi
siege. It led off all three network evening news programs for three straight
nights. 5 If commentary on the news coverage itself is excluded, total network
time figures for those three nights are: NBC, 35 minutes, 50 seconds; ABC,
26 minutes, 20 seconds; and CBS, 21 minutes, 50 seconds. Over the same
three days, each network had available the following total amounts of time for
news presentation in evening news programs; NBC, 67 minutes, 20 seconds;
ABC, 65 minutes, 50 seconds, CBS, 70 minutes. Obviously each network
devoted a substantial amount of available primes news time to Hanafi siege:
NBC, 53.22%; ABC, 40.00% and CBS 31.19%. The story clearly dominated
all else.
Fortunately, the Hanafi siege ended with but one casualty, that of a
young black reporter for the Howard University radio station, WHUR. He
seemed to be killed not because he was a reporter, but simply because he
startled leaders of the District Building occupation force at the wrong time.
On Friday, March 11, Abdul Khaalis, the Hanafi leader, and his followers
surrendered with most of their demands unmet. Controversy about the
behavior of broadcast journalists in covering this event continues, however.
Like Heckman in Indianapolis, WTOP-TV anchorman Max Robinson
established contact with the hostage taker, Khaalis, and served as the vehicle
through which Khaalis transmitted his major demands.36 The propriety of
such a role by a journalist became the subject of substantial debate. As in the
Kiritsis case, there was in the Hanafi siege a point where news coverage
enraged the hostage-taker, this time a report on WTOP (AM) early in the
siege which called the terrorists "Black Muslims." Khaalis, incensed at being
mistaken for those he thought responsible for the murder of his family, called
the station demanding an immediate apology or "I'm going to kill someone
and throw him out the window."37 The station's apology was immediate.
14WHUR Newsman Dies in Terrorist Siege of Washington, BROADCASTING, March 14,
1977, at 22-23.35Al1 of the time computations reported about the national Hanafi coverage are made from
TELEVISION NEWS INDEX AND ABSTRACTS, 460, 463, 466, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 474, 476, 479,
482, 484, 485, 490, 505, 530, 532, 536, 619, 621, 625 (March 1977).
16WHUR Newsman Dies in Terrorist Siege of Washington, BROADCASTING, March 14,
1977, at 22, 23. Robinson is now a regional anchorperson with ABC news.
3
7Id.
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Throughout the siege, police feared that TV cameras would reveal the posi-
tions of officers and sharpshooters positioned to storm the building if
necessary or, in general, reveal too much about police negotiating strategy38
CRITICISM AND EVALUATION OF COVERAGE OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS
Things were quieter for the remainder of the year. Working journalists,
however, sensed that their performance had been sometimes controversial and
perhaps deficient. Musings by public officials like Andrew Young spurred
private media self-criticism. A bit of such self-criticism had been conducted
rather publicly early in the Hanafi siege on March 10, for example, when the
CBS Evening News carried a 2 minute, 20 second commentary by Eric
Sevareid in which Sevareid admitted that the press was being held captive to
some extent by the Hanafi. The next night, March 11, Walter Cronkite
himself delivered a 50 second comment defending the coverage as necessary
to keep people informed. On March 15, Sevareid's commentary was again
concerned with the reporting difficulties, but by this time he was more active-
ly defending broadcasters from Young's comments and observing that almost
any communication will have an effect and may be "contagious." On the
same day CBS included an interview of Cronkite by CBS Correspondent Dan
Rather in its short-lived "Who's Who." Cronkite defended the need of the
press to just report events that happen, and downplayed self-censorship argu-
ing that "all that does is lead to rumor, speculation, to doubt that the press is
telling the whole story under any circumstances . . . If we cover up stories
under any circumstance, the public has every right to believe that we cover
them up under any circumstance. And if we cover up at all, then the whole
belief, reliance upon the press is gone."5 9
Much of the public ventilation of criticism of broadcast performance in
terrorism-hostage situations was defensive. The self-examination, however,
was often more critical and willing to admit problems in more private and
closed circles. Some of that "in-house" criticism appeared in print. Quill
magazine, published by Sigma Delta Chi, Society of Professional Journalists,
devoted eight pages to three articles on the controversy in its July-August,
1977 issue-itself just 39 pages long. All three were moderately critical of re-
cent press performance; one was written by a former Hanafi hostage, also a
journalist, who suggest that competitiveness had placed hostage lives in undue
danger.40 Another stressed that journalists should be better trained to under-
stand and cover terrorists. 4 1 The third suggested that formal guidelines and
more thoughful study of the problem was needed. 41
saSpeech of Bil Ellingsworth, Director of Public Affairs, International Association of Chiefs
of Police to 7th Annual Meeting of Associated Press Broadcasters, St. Louis, Mo. (June 3, 1977).
3
"Who's Who" Looks into the Ethical Questions of Covering Terrorist Acts, BROADCASTING,
March 21, 1977, at 28.
40Fenyvesi, Looking into the Muzzle of Terrorists, QUILL, July-Aug. 1977, at 16.
"Monday, What's Wrong with Our Aim, QUILL, July-Aug. 1977, at 19.
42Czerniejewski, Guidelines for the Coverage of Terrorism, QUILL, July-Aug. 1977, at 21.
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The major forum for self-appraisal of TV's performance, however, was
not articles in magazines but rather the meetings of journalistic organizations
and associations across the country in subsequent months. For months, every
gathering of broadcast journalists included a terrorist-hostage panel discussion
with a news director who had been involved in such coverage (Indianapolis or
Washington experience much preferred), a police representative, a lawyer
and nearly always a police psychologist or psychiatrist. Just two weeks after
the Hanafi siege, the Washington chapter of RTNDA sponsored such a
panel.43 Another was held three months later at the St. Louis annual conven-
tion of the Associated Press Broadcasters.' 4 Still another such panel was held
three months later at the September annual meeting of RTNDA in San Fran-
cisco. 4"
There were quite diffuse discussions, usually just brief presentations by
the panelists followed by question and answer sessions. They are hard to sum-
marize, for more than anything else they revealed how divided the broadcast
journalism community as on how to improve hostage coverage, or, for that
matter, whether improvement was needed. Psychologists and psychiatrists
most often seemed to feel that the press was unduly ignorant of the possible
effects of certain types of reporting upon often unstable terrorists, counseled
against revealing terrorist names or demands unless absolutely unavoidable,
and advised that terrorist strategy not be reported in detail. They suggested,
instead, that coverage focus on the low success rate of terrorists and on the
effects of being held hostage upon the captives. Sometimes, as in San Fran-
cisco, psychologists accused the press of engaging in an "excessive act of
public revelation," and then trying to formulate reforms of their behavior
based on limited data gathered from one or two well-known hostage situa-
tions. 46 Media representatives were frequently urged to cooperate with social
scientists in conducting careful research of the effects of the media in hostage
situations. Caution was urged until the research findings were in.
Police representatives often took conflicting views. One group seemed to
propose rather direct controls upon newsgathering such as restricting location
and use of cameras and limiting press to only a few official sources.' 7 Other
police officials, however, seemed to be taking cues from a study published by
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in 1977 and professed a
43Two Sides of the Coin on Media and Terrorists, BROADCASTING, April 4, 1977, at 78;
Debate on Coverage of Terrorism Comes up with Few Solutions, RTNDA COMMUNICATOR,
April, 1977, at 12.
14AP Meeting Told Powers Will Shift in Broadcasting over Next 10 Years, BROADCASTING.
June 13, 1977, at 54.
"1More How To than Hoopla at RTNDA, BROADCASTING, Sept 26, 1977 at 48.
46Audio tape of speech of Dr. David Hubbard, Aberrant Behavior Center, Dallas, at An-
nual Convention of Radio-Television News Directors Association, San Francisco (Sept. 17, 1977).
4"This position is typified by former D.C. Police Chief Maurice Cullinane. See D.C. Police
Seek to Limit Coverage of Terrorist Incidents, BROADCASTING, Dec. 5, 1977, at 52.
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general willingness to provide press members with more information if only
some attention would be paid to police advice about how to treat the
developing story.48 Even these police officers, however, warned journalists that
they would not always provide every bit of information to a journalist that
that journalist might desire. 49 They were particularly concerned, for two
reasons, about journalists who telephoned terrorists for interviews. First, such
interview seeking was sometimes so intense that phone lines became jammed
making it impossible for police to communicate with terrorists. Second, some
police representatives and some psychologists claimed that numerous inter-
views with terrorists often upset the terrorists psychologically or at least made
negotiation more difficult. One psychologist traced many of his negotiating
problems to the effects of phone interviews upon Khaalis and his followers. 0
Perhaps the best way to summarize press participation in these panels is
just to list many of the questions they presented to panelists. Should events
like these be covered live or could they-should they-be delayed? Would
rumor spread if reporting were delayed? Could failure to report disorder or
trouble mean that others might innocently wander into dangerous places?
Could any self-censorship or voluntary news blackout be effective in a com-
petitive situation? Should demands of terrorists be disclosed? Should they be
broadcast by the terrorists themselves? Would they have to be broadcast if the
terrorists made that a demand?
There are questions about the roles of reporters. Should they become in-
termediaries? Should they withhold information at police request? Would it
be advisable to broadcast false information at police request? Should
reporters limit themselves to official police sources only? What kinds of
reporters were needed? Should only the most experienced report, or could
anybody cover a terrorist-hostage situation? There were technical questions.
Would pooling of equipment help reduce confusion? How could such pooling
be achieved? What should field reporting conditions be? How much com-
munications was needed between field reporters and producers at studios?
Finally, there were more philosophical questions. Was media competition
having a negative effect on terrorist-hostage reporting? Did things get
reported just to "scoop" the competition? Were the visual elements of televi-
sion getting the best of the concept the journalists claimed most to rely upon,
"It is somewhat unclear when the LEAA report was released. It bears a 1976 publication
date, NATIONAL ADvisoRY COMMITrEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, DISORDERS
AND TERRORISM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON DIsORDERS AND TERRORISM (1976). An April
issue of LF4A Newsletter says that the report was "published a week before the Washington,
D.C. siege by Hanafi Muslims," which would be 1977. Task Force Urges Restraint, Negotiation
with Terrorists, LEAA NEWSLErrER, April, 1977, at 1.
4Speech by Bill Ellingsworth, Director of Public Affairs, International Association of
Chiefs of Police, at Associated Press Broadcasters, 7th Annual Meeting, St. Louis (June 3, 1977).
ssAudio tape of speech of Dr. David Hubbard, Abberrant Behavior Center, Dallas, at An-
nual Convention of Radio-Television News Directors Association, San Francisco, (Sept. 17, 1977).
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newsworthiness? Should any journalist attempt to consider the consequences
of reporting news in making decisions about what to report and what to
withhold? These and other issues were discussed, but usually little was resolv-
ed.
There was some discussion over how there could be any resolution and
how it could be communicated to journalists and perhaps enforced upon
them. One psychologist, Dr. David Hubbard, noted that the news industry
seemed "to lack internal professional organs through which to distribute
knowledge of this subject if you had it."'5 There was something of an answer
to Hubbard's observation in that guidelines, if they could be written, could
be distributed internally by most news organizations and externally through
publications such as Broadcasting magazine or the RTNDA Communicator.
However, there was, and is, substantial controversy over whether formal writ-
ten guidelines can or should be prepared. The April issue of RTNDA Com-
municator summarized these conferences by nothing that "by and large, the
police want to restrict the media and to establish guidelines for coverage of
incidents where lives are at stake, while journalists want to have the freedom
to report the story as fully as possible."5 2 There is a slight error in the state-
ment for there were really two kinds of guidelines discussed. One kind, the
types referred to in the quotation above, would be the joint product of police
and press and apply, probably with some force, to both. Washington D.C.
police chief Maurice J. Cullinane proposed such a "mutual agreement" late in
1977 but found it roundly criticized by working journalists as a restriction on
general press freedom and by broadcast journalists as an impermissive delega-
tion of programming responsibility.5 3 Cullianane's successor, Burtell M. Jef-
ferson, modified his predecessor's proposal in early 1978, converting it into a
call for the second kind of guideline that had been more frequently and
positively discussed, a guideline drawn up by the press alone rather than by
press and police cooperatively.5 4
The idea of such a media-controlled and originated guideline attracted
some in the press but repelled others, 5 Sam Zelman, Executive Director of
News for WJLA-TV (Washington, D.C.) argued vigorously against such
guidelines, feeling that such self-censorship interrupted the free flow of infor-
mation to the public and that guidelines were impossible to write, given the
511d.
52Debate on Coverage of Terrorism Comes up with Few Solutions, RTNDA COMMUNI-
CATOR, April, 1977 at 12.
55D.C. Police Seek to Limit Coverage of Terrorist Incidents, BROADCASTING, Dec. 5, 1977,
at 52.
54D. C. Police Back Off, BROADCASTING, Jan. 23, 1978, at 56.
5 One of the strongest pleas for written codes came from media critic Ed Diamond of
WTOP. Diamond proposed that hostage takers never be given air time to state a position or
declare a grievance, that no pictures of terrorism in progress be used and that there be no per-
sonal publicity at all until the police close the case. Diamond, Media Critic Seeks Code on
Handling Hostage Situations, RTNDA COMMUNICATOR, April 1977, at 13.
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variability of hostage situations.56 A Vice President of RTNDA took a similar
position. 7 Other broadcast journalists saw promise in a written guideline ap-
proach, however, for by midyear two major national news suppliers, CBS
News and UPI, had drafted written terrorism-hostage guidelines.
On April 14, 1977, Richard S. Salant, President of CBS News, issued
"production guidelines to be followed by CBS News in its 'coverage of ter-
rorists."' The two-page, single spaced release began with four assumptions:
(1) that there was a real possibility of "contagion" in covering these kinds of
events but, (2) that suppressing news could adversely affect CBS News'
credibility, (3) encourage rumor, and (4) distort news judgments "for some
extraneous judgmental purpose." Starting from these notions, CBS offered
seven guidelines for exercising "particular care in how we treat the ter-
rorist/kidnapper."8
The UPI guidelines, prepared by the United Press International National
Broadcast Advisory Board and published in November, were obviously based
in part on the CBS Guidelines but were more succinct:
1. Each station should have established procedures for coverage of such
events, which should include prompt notification of management.
2. Judge each story on its own and if the story is newsworthy, cover it.
3. Coverage should be thoughtful, conscientious and show restraint, and be
carried ot with an awareness of the potential danger to life and person.
4. Report demands made as an essential point of the story but do not pro-
vide an excessive platform for those demands.
5. Reporters should avoid deliberately injecting themselves into the story as
intermediaries or negotiators.
6. If there has been no mention of a deadline, no one should ask the
terrorist-kidnappers if there IS one.
7. Above all, apply the rules of common sense., 9
By the time of the RTNDA National Convention in San Francisco in
September, 1977, written guidelines had become a very commonly made sug-
gestion for action in the terrorist-hostage issue, although there was con-
siderable disagreement about what to put into the guidelines. The National
News Council in March, 1977, volunteered to "become a repository for such
56Speech of Sam Zelman, WJLA-TV, at Associated Press Broadcasters, 7th Annual
Meeting, St. Louis, Mo. (June 3, 1977).
5 Schultz, Censorship is No Solution to Coverage of Terrorist-Hostage Situations, RTNDA
COMMUNICATOR, July 1977, at 6.
58See Appendix A.
"
9 These guidelines were sent out in the undated wall poster form, but announced as for-
thcoming in Terrorism/Kidnapping Coverage Guidelines, NAB HIGHLIGHTS Nov. 7, 1977, at 3.
Earlier UPI released slightly different guidelines intended primarily for print journalists. UPI
Guidelines for Coverage of Terrorism, NAB HIGHLIGHTS, June 1, 1977, at 3. See also UPI Adopts
Guidelines for Coverage of Terrorism, RTNDA COMMUNICATOR, July 1977, at 4. The print
guidelines contain much more absolute prohibitions than the broadcast guidelines about jour-
nalists not becoming a part of the story or taking part in negotiations.
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guidelines or internal memoranda and to circulate them to all interested news
organizations. s"60 At the RTNDA conference, Salant support this News Coun-
cil effort, but at the same time made it quite clear who he believed should be
writing and enforcing guidelines or standards for media behavior: "For God's
sake, leave it in the hands of professional journalists. '61 Salant was certainly
not the only participant on these panels, or in their audiences, to describe
journalists as professionals and then to suggest that a large portion of the
"solution" of the terrorist-hostage problem could be found in giving jour-
nalists professional autonomy. There were others who argued that journalists,
like doctors, lawyers and educators, should be largely left alone to regulate
their affairs for they knew best how to do it. To use the term to describe
journalists, however, is a bit odd, because there is reasonable doubt that jour-
nalists are, can be, or even wish to be highly professionalized as defined by
sociologists or by the law.
THE JOURNALIST AS PROFESSIONAL?
The issue of the professionalism of journalists has been a long-standing
subject of inquiry in law and sociology. Sociologists usually conclude that
journalists are not highly professionalized.6 2 The law-or labor law at
least-usually must make a dichotomous judgment; one is either a profes-
sional or one is not, and it has consistently been concluded that journalists
are not professionals under the National Labor Relations Act.
63
Mass communications scholars have studied the professionalism of jour-
nalists since at least 1964. Their inquiry is sometimes confused by the issue of
whether one should focus on the general occupation-is journalism a profes-
sion?-or upon the specific practitioners- are journalists professionals? Even
when researchers make a choice between these two approaches, or
simultaneously examine both, there remains substantial disagreement about
the defining criteria for either a profession or for professionalization. When
inquiry into occupational sociology began, there was a tendency to simply
classify persons as professionals or non-professionals. More contemporary
sociological study, however, looks on professionalism as a continuous variable
and will more likely try to determine how professional a worker is compared
"°National News Council, Statement on Terrorism and the Media, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REv., May-June, 1977, at 81 (May-June 1977).
61Audio tape of speech of Richard Salant, President, CBS News at RTNDA Annual Con-
vention, San Francisco (Sept. 17, 1977). To be fair to Salant, it should be noted that this quota-
tion was also addressed to the issue of who should be reporting on terrorists activities. Salant did
not want such reporting done by "amateurs who are entertainers." He had also earlier in his
speech used a phrase "We're in the news business, or profession, or craft" indicating that Salant
may not thoroughly convinced that journalism is a profession.
62See text accompanying notes 64-70.
6 See text accompanying notes 71-83.
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either to co-workers in the same field or to workers in other fields usually
thought of as professions.
64
Clearly the seminal piece of research on journalistic professionalism was a
study reported by McLeod and Hawley in 1964.65 Those authors settled on a
list of eight criteria relevant to deciding if an occupation was a profession:
(1) it must perform a unique and essential service, 2) it must emphasize in-
tellectual techniques, 3) it must have a long period of specialized training to
acquire a systematic body of knowleged based on research, 4) it must be
given a broad range of automony, 5) its practitioners must accept broad per-
sonal responsibility for judgments and actions, 6) it must place greater em-
phasis on service than on private economic gain, 7) it must develop a com-
prehensive self-governing organization and 8) it must have a code of ethics
which has been clarified and interpreted by concrete cases."6
Admitting that they were unsure that journalism really displayed all these
characteristics, they nonetheless predicted that a "professional person should
place heavy emphasis on service, intellectual activity, autonomy, and in-
fluence. '67 These predictions were converted to hypotheses that more
professionally-oriented journalists: "1) would be more in favor of implemen-
ting professional values and 2) would be more critical of the newspaper for
which they work." 68 The researchers were able to divide the editorial
employees of the Milwaukee Journal and Sentinel into a professional group
and a group they called "semi-pros;" the former group did have higher sup-
port for professional values while being more critical of their respective
newspapers than was true of the semi-pros. In simple terms, the authors
found that some journalists at the newspapers they studied were more profes-
sionalized than others, and that all of the journalists were more profes-
sionalized that non-editorial employees at the same newspapers. Their study,
however, did not permit them to say much about the absolute rather than
relative strength of journalistic professionalism for there was no comparison of
their journalists with workers from other fields. They nonetheless concluded
that they had shown journalists to be somewhat professionalized. 6"
"See Kimball, Journalism: Art, Craft or Profession? in K. LYNN. THE PROFESSIONS IN
AMERICA 242 (1965). Several useful general introductions to occupational professionalization from
a sociological perspective are id.; R. PAVALKO, SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON OCCUPATIONS
(1972), H. VOLLMER & D. MILLS, PROFESSIONALIZATION (1966). Of somewhat less use but still of
interest are: M. ABRAHAMSON, THE PROFESSIONAL IN THE ORGANIZATION (1967); A. ETZIONI. THE
SEMI-PROFESSIONS AND THEIR ORGANIZATION (1969); E. FREIDSON, THE PROFESSIONS AND THEIR
PROSPECTS (1971); PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONALIZATION (J. Jackson ed. 1970); M. MOORE, THE
PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RULES (1970); R. PAVALKO, SOCIOLOGY OF OCCUPATIONS AND PROF.S-
SIONS (1971); J. TUNSTALL, MEDIA SOCIOLOGY (1970).
"McLeod & Hawley, Professionalization Among Newsmen, 41 JOURNALISM Q. 529 (1964).
'11d. at 530.71d.
6SId.
"Id. at 537-38, 577.
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Four major studies of broadcast journalists have reached about the same
conclusions: that broadcast journalism exhibits only some of the traits of a
profession and that some broadcast jorunalists are more piofessionalized than
others.7 0 In general, however, nearly all who have studied the professionalism
of journalists- both in broadcasting and in print-have concluded that at
best, journalists are semi-professionals or emerging professionals and that
there are many ways in which journalism itself, largely through lack of a
7°LeRoy takes professionalism as a continuous variable and focuses on five clusters or
categories of attitudes and beliefs: (1) the use of organizations as major reference groups; (2) a
belief in service to the public; (3) a belief in self-regulation; (4) a sense of calling to the field and
(5) autonomy in one's work. In other words, there must be both a professional structure and in-
ternalized professional values. Like others, LeRoy is trying mainly to measure how professional
journalistic practitioners are by measuring a national sample of TV journalists. Fortunately,
however, LeRoy goes an important step beyond McLeod & Hawley in that he uses measures of
professionalization that had been applied to other occupational groups. In general, journalists
came out about as professional as librarians. Stockbrokers were the most professionalized, lawyers
ranked fifth, advertising personnel seventh, physicians eighth, personnel managers tenth,
engineers eleventh and journalists nineth. LeRoy found that television journalists did not much
look to formal groups as reference points (25th of 27 occupations here), were somewhat suppor-
tive of self-regulation (17 of 27 occupations on this factor), relatively low in calling to their field
(25 of 27), moderate in sense of autonomy in work (14 of 27) but extremely high in commitment
to public service (3 of 27). In these five areas, television journalists fell below the median of all
occupations in four of five instances. Traditional professions, law and medicine, hovered about
the median rank. LeRoy concluded that there was "a crude sort of professionalism" among the
journalists he studied, at least relative to other occupations. LeRoy, Levels of Professionalism in a
Sample of Television Newsmen, 17 J. BROADCASTING 51(1972-73). In a less sophisticated way.
Weinthal and O'Keefe applied McLeod's techniques to working broadcast journalists in Denver,
Colorado. They focused their attention on the desire to implement professional standards,
amount of criticism of station, willingness to leave broadcast journalism, education, organiza-
tional membership and some on-the-job behaviors. Like previous researchers, they found some
broadcast journalists more professionalized than others, and generally similar to print journalists.
Weinthal & O'Keefe, Professionalism Among Broadcast Newsmen in an Urban Area, 18 J.
BROADCASTING 193 (1974).
The most recent study of professionalism as well as other interesting aspects of the life of
the working press is. J. JOHNSTONE, E. SLAWsKI, & W. BOWMAN, THE NEWS PEOPLE (1976). They
tackle the professionalism issue two ways. From primarily historical analysis they conclude that
journalism is something of a profession: it is full-time; there are training facilities for practi-
tioners; there are professional associations; formal codes of ethics and "legal sanction, of a kind,
for its work territory." Id. at 102. They also found that attitudinally, journalists tended to place
importance on being able to work independently and on the service aspects of their work, de-
emphasized monetary rewards and other tangible benefits. Id. at 111. They found, however,
mixed data on use of professional groups as reference points. Formal professional groups were
primarily used only by those already established in the field, and then but weakly used. Informal
groups and contacts among co-workers was a trait of journalists moving up in the field, of broad-
cast journalists and of journalists in large communities. Like everyone else, the authors conclude
that journalists are somewhat professionalized calling them semi-professionals or emerging profes-
sionals.
A final study related to broadcast professionalism is Idsvoog & Hoyt, Professionalism and
Performance of TelevisionJournalists, 21 J. BROADCASTING 97 (1977). These authors apply McLeod
measures to television journalists in six Wisconsin markets. Their main interest, however, is not
in measuring professionalism but rather in testing an often associated assumption, namely that
professional journalists are more skillful than non-professionals. Skill was measured by ability to
edit a newsfilm script, and the authors conclude that skill is directly related to degree of profes-
sionalism.
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licensing system, is only approaching the status of a profession. Usually the
journalist comes out as not as professional as more traditional professionals
such as lawyers or physicians. It appears then that journalists have, at best,
some difficulty supporting claims that they are entitled to self-regulatory
autonomy on a sociological basis.
One may then inquire wither their position is supported by or recognized
by the law. If anything, however, the law is more emphatic than sociology in
its judgment that journalism is not a profession and its practitioners are not
professionals. Such determinations are commonly made in the area of labor
law. Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), professionals are en-
titled to form unions an claim the protections of the act.71 However, section
9(b)(1) provides that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) may not
group "professional employees and employees who are not professional
employees" into a single bargaining unit "unless a majority of such profes-
sional employees vote for inclusion in such unit."2 Accordingly, the NLRB
has, on occasion, decided whether working journalists are professionals entitl-
ed to a self-determination election. The question turns on the definition of
"professional employee" in section (2)(12) of the act. 73 A professional
employee is:
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and
varied in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical or
physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment
in its performance; (iii) of such a character that the output produced or the
result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of
time; (iv) requiring knowledge of a advanced type in a field of science or
learning cumstomarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellec-
tual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital,
as distinguished from a general academic education or from an appren-
ticeship or from training in the performance off routine mental, manual, or
physical processes; or
(b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized in-
tellectual instruction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and
(ii) is performing related work under the supervision of a professional person
to qualify himself to become a professional employee as defined in paragraph
(a).
In two cases decided the year following enactment of this section of the
act, the NLRB ruled that working journalists did not fit within this definition
of professional employee. What was particularly important in both cases was
the requirement for study in a specialized discipline ordinarily taught in a
university. In the first of these cases, the American Newspaper Guild attemp-
ted to organize all editorial employees of the Hoboken New Jersey Jersey
7
'Leedom v. Kyne, 249 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1957), affd, 358 U.S. 184 (1959);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB. 236 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1956).
'29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1970).
"29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1970).
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Observer. 74 The employer argued that some of these employees were profes-
sionals under the NLRA. The Board found that "[n]one of the employees in
the editorial department", either those the editor thought professional or any
others, "are required to have a license or to undergo specialized training in a
school of higher learning. 75 Further, the Board could not discern any mean-
ingful distinction between the editorial employees claimed to be professionals
and those for whom that status was not asserted: "[w]e are of the opinion that
the employees asserted by the Employer to be professional employees are not
professional employees within the meaning of Section 2(12) of the Act." 76 Just
29 days later, the NLRB reinforced this holding with another opinion. There
the Newspaper Guild wanted to exclude certain editors, reporters and clerks
from a bargaining unit and assert that they were professional employees. The
board rejected the argument, noting that "[t]here is no evidence that any of
these employees perform work that requires knowledge of an advanced type,
in a field of learning customarily acquired by a course of specialized intellec-
tual instruction in an institution of higher learning, as distinguished from a
general academic education. They do not fall, therefore, within the meaning
of a 'professional employee."' 77
In 1976, the NLRB was expressly invited, in the Express-News Corpora-
tion case, to reconsider these old holdings.78 The case arose when the San An-
tonio Typographical Union attempted to form a bargaining unit composed of
reporters, editors, photographers as well as librarians, copy carriers and
operators of computerized copy processing machines. The employer, the
Express-News Corporation, challenged this as an impermissible combination
of professional and non-professional employees requiring a self-determination
election. The newspaper was well aware of the 1948 precedents against its
position, but argued that those cases "should be reversed and journalists ac-
corded professional status in view of the dynamic changes which have occur-
red in the communications media in recent years."7 9 To the paper, these
changes included increased specialization of reporters, increased numbers of
college-trained personnel and a preference for college graduates, better
cooperation between the newspaper industry and communications schools and
"the unique responsibility of a free press in a democratic system."8 0
The NLRB declined the invitation to reconsider. To the NLRB it was
particularly important that this newspaper did not require specialized
74Jersey Publishing Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 467 (1948).
"Id. at 469.
761d.
"Free Press Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 1047, 1049-50 (1948). There appear to have been no cases
yet involving the professionalism of broadcast journalists, but broadcast announcers were deter-
mined not to be professional employees in West Cent. Broadcasting, Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 366
(1948). Some broadcast engineers, usually those experimenting with new broadcast equipment,
have however been determined to be professional employees. See Southwestern Sales Corp., 93
N.L.R.B. 936 (1951); Southern Radio and Television Equip. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 216 (1953).
"Express-News Corp., 223 N.L.R.B. 627 (1976).
"Id. at 628.
8Id.
[Vol. 53:745
TELEVISION AND TERRORISM
knowledge or training of all the claimed professional employees: "the news
department herein is not predominantly composed of individuals with ad-
vanced knowledge acquired through a prolonged course of specialized study
in journalism or communications in an institution of higher learning."8' This
would suggest that a newspaper staffed predominantly with college journalism
graduates might succeed in getting those employees classified as professionals.
However, that seems unlikely in light of another aspect of the NLRB ruling.
The Board examined the work performed by the Express-News staff and con-
cluded that the staff members who did not have college journalism
backgrounds nonetheless functioned well: "the work of these journalists is not
'professional' within the meaning of the Act because it can be competently
accomplished without requiring advanced degrees in journalism or equivalent
experience." 82 Thus, as recently as two years ago, the NLRB adhered to
precedent and ruled that newspaper journalists, at least, are not professionals
under the National Labor Relations Act.8 3
Journalists, then, are clearly not professionals by law and are at best
semi-professionals by sociological standards. The claim by Salant and others
that "professional journalists" should be free to solve the ,terrorism-hostage
coverage problems by self-regulation, then, is not supportable if it rests upon
legal or sociological evidence of professionalism. Arguments based upon pro-
fessionalism being without support, perhaps, the best answer to the problem
appears in advice given by Dr. David Hubbard at the San Francisco RTNDA
convention: gather more data, systematically, before becoming committed to
any particular course of action and do not generalize from the hit-and-miss
evidence available from present documentary sources or convention
transcripts. 84 There is a real need for a better data base on how prepared
broadcast journalists are to cope with terrorist-hostage coverage, what values
they bring to that task and how they might deal with common problems in
terrorist-hostage coverage.
SURVEY OF BROADCAST STATION NEWS DIRECTORS
In December, 1977 the author mailed survey forms to a sample of broad-
cast station news directors as part of an effort to gather some of the needed
"
8Id. at 629.
82Id. at 631. The Express-News holding has been followed in Binghamton Press Co.
1976-77 NLRB Dec. 17,532 (1976).
"
3Another area of the law which suggests that journalists are not professionals is that of
privilege. Many professional groups are accorded privilege by statute, others have been granted it
by case law. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court concluded
that, at the very least, journalists could gain a testimonial privilege only if one were created for
them by statute. The court rejected notions that the privilege might be appropriate because of
the professional nature of the journalists.
"Audio tape of speech of Dr. David Hubbard, Aberrant Behavior Center, Dallas, at An-
nual Convention of Radio-Television News Directors Association, San Francisco, (Sept. 17, 1977).
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data. The survey focused on four areas thought to be central to the general
controversy: (1) attitudes toward, and experiences with, self-regulatory codes,
(2) attitudes toward statements derived from the existing CBS and UPI codes,
and other statements directed at aspects of the controversy gathered from the
literature and from convention sessions, (3) selected aspects of professionalism
and professional automony and (4) probable behavior in hypothetical situa-
tions.8
The sample was selected to include broadcast stations throughout the
United States-large markets as well as small ones, commercial and non-
commercial stations. Since terrorism is a potential problem everywhere, all
broadcast journalists should be capable of coping with it. Casting such a wide
net, however, means that most respondents to this survey-like most broad-
cast journalists-have had little actual experience in covering terrorist hostage
situations. Of 103 respondents who answered a question about prior terrorist-
hostage experience, only 15 (14.6%) reported that they had covered such a
situation. For most, then, this questionnaire posed new experiences of a
hypothetical nature.
If, however, ENG equipment increases the possibility that a journalist will
confront the problems associated with live coverage of terrorist-hostage in-
cidents, then the results of this survey are pertinent to making decisions about
what to do about terrorist-hostage coverage, for the survey confirms high
penetration of ENG equipment. If only commercial TV stations are counted,
then 67.1% of them (57 of 85) reported having ENG cameras and portable
video units. The microwave equipment needed to go to live "real time"
transmission, however, is held by only 40.0% of commercial stations (34 of85). 86
The news directors working for these stations seem to be experienced
broadcast journalists. Nearly all (68 of 85, 80.0%) have more than 6 years of
broadcast journalism experience. For more than half of the news directors, it
appears that all of their experience is in broadcast journalism with no prior
"
5The sample consisted of 250 News director chosen with equal probability of entry from
BROADCASTING YEARBOOK 1977. The questionnaries were mailed November 30, 1977. On
December 17, 1977, 193 follow-up questionnaires were mailed. Eventually 115 responses were
received, for a response rate of 47%. This would not normally be considered a highly successful
response rate, but news personnel are notoriously hard to survey and really appears to be above
average. LeRoy, for example, had a 40% response rate with an original questionnaire and two
follow-ups. LeRoy, supra note 70, at 54. He reports this response rate as "similar to the levels
reached by other surveys of broadcasting personnel." Id. at 62 n.12. Considering the holiday
season, this response is considered quite satisfactory. The respondents are representatives of the
universe at large in terms of proportions of network, affiliated, independent and public TV sta-
tions. Large markets are slightly underrepresented, a problem also encountered by LeRoy.
The author was assisted in the design and execution of the survey by the following graduate
students in R500, Research Methods in Telecommunications: Barbara Jackson, Penny Legate,
Cynthia Lont, Karen Merz, Christopher Roberge, Ivy Shih, James Smith and Tim Walker. They
are hereby thanked for their assistance.8 6The data suggests that the public television respondents may be non-representative of
public television in general. It is unlikely, for example, that even the reported 29.4% of public
stations (5 of 17) have live microwave capability. It is suspected that returns from public stations
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print journalism experience (48 of 80, 60.0%). Despite this experience, these
news directors are relatively young with 54.1% (46 of 85) being between the
ages of 31 and 40.
Over a quarter of the stations represented here (22 of 62, 26.2%) claim
to have already adopted written codes for handling terrorist-hostage situa-
tions. The existing codes of CBS and UPI are to some extent used as models,
for five of the stations with codes used a network code as a model and four
used codes of "non-network news suppliers (e.g., AP, UPI)." Four stations
claimed to have developed their code on their own without use of a model,
and the remaining stations borrowed from a wide variety of sources.
A substantial number of stations that have not yet adopted codes are con-
sidering them. Most commonly, a station that has not adopted a code will say
that it "may do so" (19 of 57, 33.3%). Many stations also said they were
considering a code when the survey arrived but had not yet actually started
writing it down (16 of 57, 28.1%). One station (1 of 57, 1.8%) claimed to be
writing a code when the survey was taken. About one quarter of the stations,
however, seem unlikely to adopt written codes: 22.8% (13 of 57) said they
probably would not consider writing a code while 14.0% (8 of 57) said they
definitely had decided against writing one.
All respondents were asked to assume that written codes were inevitable
and then permitted to indicate a preference among certain types of codes.
Four options were available: the most preferred was a code where compliance
was discretionary and the language general or broad-i.e., a very nonspecific
and non-binding guide. This was favored by 45.0% of respondents (36 of 80).
A general but non-discretionary code had slightly less support (25 of 80,
31.3%). Apparently broadcast news directors are more concerned about the
language of codes becoming too precise than they are about whether com-
pliance with codes is mandatory or discretionary, for codes with specific
language were not favored. Only 16.2% (13 of 80) of respondents supported
a discretionary code with specific language, and just 7.5% (6 of 80) sup-
ported a code that" was both mandatory and specific-the most precise
possibility. There seems to be a willingness to get together with other broad-
casters in a market to write codes (63 of 84, 75.0%) but apparently the news
directors do not believe that those codes, once written, need be adopted on a
market-wide basis, a proposal sometimes advanced to reduce the alleged ill
effects of competition upon terrorist-hostage coverage. Only 23.5% of
respondents (20 of 85) believed market-wide codes appropriate.
came from the most sophisticated public television stations and that non-sophisticated public TV
stations did not respond at all. Since public TV stations are represented in about the proper pro-
portion in the overall returns, it must be the case that sophisticated public TV stations were
more interested in responding to the survey, perhaps to demonstrate their sophistication with and
interest in news, than was true for average commercial stations. In any event, all data reported
hereafter will use only the data from commercial stations, combining both affiliated and in-
dependent stations.
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It is obvious that these local broadcast news executives believe that if
codes are adopted at all they should be adopted at the local station level. Of
85 respondents to questions about who should adopt codes if any are
adopted, 74.1% (63 of 85) thought local stations should. Professional broad-
casting associations like the NAB and RTNDA had the next greatest sup-
port-35.3% (30 of 85). Networks followed, being favored by 28.2% (24 of
85). As already stated, there was less support for marketwide adoption (20 of
85, 23.5%), codes adopted by braodcast station groups (19 of 85, 22.4%)
or-strangely, given the high ranking of network codes-codes adopted by
non-network news suppliers such as the wire services (15 of 85, 17.6%). There
was almost no support for the notion that the FCC might promulgate or
adopt a terrorist hostage code (3 of 85, 3.5%).
A further series of questions probed the possible content of codes by seek-
ing the news director' opinions about statements derived from the existing
CBS and UPI codes. The results are shown in Table 1. As can be seen, there
was very modest support for most of the statements, as well as for the general
notion of having written codes. There was a slight tendency to agree that
competition could make terrorism-hostage coverage more difficult, but there
was disagreement with the proposition that ENG equipment made it more
difficult for broadcast journalists to cover the news responsibly. Two
statements related to the codes drew disagreement. Respondents tended to
disagree slightly with the notion that failure to report all could reduce the
credibility of the broadcast media, one of the premises upon which the CBS
Guidelines had been based. All of the CBS Guideline statements found sup-
port. One UPI guideline statement-that reporters should never become in-
termediaries between terrorists and police-drew modest disagreement.8 7
Perhaps the most interesting finding is that there was less support for the pro-
positions upon which the CBS guidelines were founded than for the guidelines
themselves; apparently not all working news directors make the same assump-
tions about the effects of terrorist-hostage coverage or the self-censorship of
news as do the executives of CBS News.a8
87See note 59 supra. The questionnaire was prepared before the UPI National Broadcast
Advisory Board released its modification of the general UPI guidelines. Accordingly, this survey
response is to a hard-line position not taken by the Broadcast Advisory Board. It suggests that
the board may have known that broadcast journalists in general would not support such a
hardline position on journalists as intermediaries. Often broadcast journalists get "scoops" by of-
fering to substitute themselves for hostages. See In Brief, BROADCASTING, Jan. 2, 1978, at 26, for
a story where two Chicago TV newsmen became involved as intermediaries, and one of the
newsmen was exchanged for two hostages. According to the story, the two newsmen talked the
gunman involved into giving himself up to police.
880ne survey of television news directors from the nation's "30 major cities" and police
chiefs from the same cities found a high degree of support for the seven CBS Guidelines. CBS
News' Ground Rules for Terrorist Coverage Backed by Peers, Law Enforcers, BROADCASTING
Nov. 7, 1977, at 42. The methodology of this study is unclear-it may be that respondents were
simply asked if they supported or opposed the guidelines, and opposing these is a bit like oppos-
ing motherhood-the scale is not adequately sensitive if that procedure was used. The response
rate among news directors was only 35%. See note 85 supra.
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TABLE 1: NEWS DIRECTOR OPINIONS OF STATEMENTS DRAWN
FROM EXISTING CODES OR RELATED TO THE
TERRORISM -HOSTAGE DILEMMA.
Mean Score*
A. Statements based on the assumptions behind the CBS
Guidelines.
Live coverage of terrorist/hostage situations incites more
such incidents. 2.905
Failure to broadcast all the news of a terrorist/hostage
situation is likely to encourage the spread of rumors. 2.762
Failure to broadcast all the news of a terrorist/hostage
situation is likely to reduce the credibility of the broadcast
media. 3.060
B. Statements based directly on some of the seven CBS
Guidelines.
It is better to have reporters report terrorist demands than
to let the terrorists on the air themselves. 2.183
Journalists must remember that activities like calling
terrorists on the phone may disrupt proper police activities. 2.096
Experts in terrorist/hostage negotiations should be consulted
for guidance in how to cover a situation without
exacerbating it. 2.048
Journalists should give police names of "key" reporters
to contact if police want to offer guidance on coverage. 2.452
C. Statements based directly on some UPI guidelines.
If terrorist stories are newsworthy, they must be
covered. 1.494
Reporters should never be intermediaries between terrorists
and police. 3.167
"Common Sense" is a workable guide for covering
terrorists. 1.793
D. Miscellaneous Statements.
It's important for broadcasters to have written codes to
follow. 2.829
Live "ENG" equipment has made it harder for broad-
cast journalists to cover the news responsibly. 3.321
Competition from other media can make it harder to cover
terrorist/hostage situations responsibly. 2.512
*Mean on a range of 1-5: 1 = Strongly Agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = No Opinion,
4 = Disagree, 5 = Strongly Disagree.
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Generally these news directors have the authority- autonomy-to inter-
rupt their station's entertainment programming to present live news coverage.
Of 85 stations responding, the news director has that authority in 55.3% of
the cases (47 of 85). For 18 stations, the authority reaches still lower to news
producers or to anchorpersons (18 of 85, 21.1%). However, in about one
fourth of all stations (20 of 85, 23.5%), news directors do not have the
authority to interrupt programming; that is a function reserved for the
general manager. In the sense that most have the authority to interrupt pro-
gramming, there may be something of mild indication of professionalism.
Those without that autonomy, who must instead depend on general managers
who are usually not journalists, may be less professionalized. Other evidence
of the professionalism of these news directors was found in their memberships
in organizations and associations. Over three-fourths of the commercial sta-
tions responding to the survey are members of the National Association of
Broadcasters (67 of 85, 78.8%)-a figure comparable with NAB's national
membership percentage-and most follow the NAB Code (62 of 85, 72.9%).
A large proportion of the responding news directors (54 of 85, 63.5%) are in-
dividual members of RTNDA. They tend not, however, to be members of
Sigma Delta Chi, an honorary journalistic organization (29 of 85, 34.1%) or
of local journalistic organizations (22 of 85, 25.9%). The RTNDA figure may
be slightly higher than that found by other researchers, but the lack of local
ties is consistent with previous research. 89 A few questions were asked to
measure the extent to which these news directors held professional values and,
like earlier studies, it was found that these respondents can at best be describ-
ed as modestly professionalized with some holding more tightly to professional
values than others.9 0
Finally, respondents were given an opportunity to indicate how they
would respond in six hypothetical terrorist-hostage coverage situations. They
were presented with the hypothetical situation and then forced to select from
among closed response alternatives. Offensive language-as in the Kiritsis
case-was not for most a reason to halt coverage altogether. The most com-
mon response would be to stop transmission of the audio signal alone (36 of
89See note 70 supra.95Respondents tended to agree with statements that: they had a public responsibility, that
they needed written codes, that they had a right to help set news policy. There agreements sug-
gest professional values. Respondents tended to disagree with statements that: time pressure could
be allowed to affect accuracy, personal beliefs could be altered to get along with management.
Here disagreeing with a statement indicated professionalism. There were two statements with
which agreement would indicate professionalism but which produced disagreement. Slight
disagreement came to a statement suggesting that newsmen should be required to take refresher
courses at colleges or universities. Very substantial disagreement came to the statement "There
should be a respected organization of journalists that certifies other new journalists to insure the
qualifications, training competence of those who practice journalism." There was one statement
where disagreement would indicate professionalism but which produced slight agreement: "A
journalist should continue to work for a station even if he disagrees with its editorial policy."
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84, 42.9%), but 29.8% of the respondents (35 of 84) would do nqthing and
simply let the language go out over the airwaves. A small number of news
directors would let the language go on, but have the reporter or anchor occa-
sionally offer apologies for it (14 of 84, 16.7%). Only 8.3% (7 of 84) would
stop coverage completely.
More respondents would be likely to stop coverage completely if there was
a "good chance that somebody may be physically hurt or murdered on
camera" (30 of 83, 36.1%), but the most common response here was simply
to let the live coverage continue (43 of 83, 51.8%). A small number of news
directors would switch frequently between the field crew and studio and simp-
ly hope that if anything happened it would be while the studio rather than
the field cameras were on (9 of 83, 10.8%).
Four of the hypotheticals dealt with police-media interaction.
Respondents were asked what they would do if police asked that information
be withheld claiming that the information would harm lives if released. All
respondents indicated they would provide some cooperation, but in varying
degrees. Slightly more than half (43 of 83, 51.8%) would be selective about
what they would withhold, taking the police request into account but still
broadcasting what they "felt the public had a right to know." However,
48.2% (40 of 83) would comply totally with the police request.
The respondents were much less likely to comply with a police request to
"broadcast information you know is false, saying that it would help save
lives." Here the most frequent response was to not broadcast the information
at all (38 of 80, 47.5%) with the next most common response being to broad-
cast it, but note on the air that it was being broadcast at police request (30 of
80, 37.5%). A few news directors (8 of 80, 10%) would comply without ques-
tion with this kind of police request, but 3.7% (3 of 80) would partially
divulge the police plan by reporting that police had requested false informa-
tion be broadcast (they would not broadcast the information itself) and 1.2%
(1 of 80) would broadcast the information, but then say it as false and that
police had requested its transmission.
Most respondents seem willing to broadcast terrorist press conferences on
a police request that it be done to save lives. However nearly all wanted it
understood by the terrorist that coverage might be cut off (38 of 79, 48.1%).
About a quarter of the respondents (19 of 79, 24.1%) would cover the con-
ference in full without condition. The same number, however, would cover it
only if it did not have to be done live at all. A small number (3 of 79, 3.8%)
would not broadcast the press conference at all.
Finally, few would comply with a police request to limit contacts to a
single official source, even if it were claimed that that would save lives. Only
25.9% (21 of 81) would accept that kind of request. The rest (60 of 81,
74.1%) would use any sources they thought appropriate in addition to the of-
ficial police source.
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PROPOSALS FOR 'FUTURE REGULATION
OF THE MEDIA'S RESPONSE TO TERRORISM
The data from the survey generally support an interpretation that many
broadcasters are concerned about terrorist-hostage coverage and would sup-
port some of the ideas advanced, including written codes, to deal with those
types of coverage problems. There remains substantial disagreement within
the journalism community over who should adopt such codes, how rigorous or
specific they should be, and exactly what they should encourage or
discourage. Like other aspects of this paper, this sui'vey suggests at best quasi-
professionalism of journalists, for "professionalism requires a sharing of
values" 91 while the survey shows journalists, on these issues, to be quite
heterogeneous in outlook. It is possible that this heterogeneity of outlook is
not an indication of low professionalism but is simply natural in a problem
area-like live TV coverage of hostage situations-of recent origin. Perhaps a
more professional homogeneity will arise in the future. Given the consistent
findings of occupational sociologists over the years, however, there is no
realistic reason for expecting that to occur. Perhaps, however, there may be
sound grounds other than the claim of professionalism for generally leaving
broadcast journalists alone to solve problems of terrorist-hostage coverage.
Most likely, the government should leave journalists to self regulation in
this area not because they are, might be, or even want to be professionals as
defined by sociologists or the law but, instead, because of the function jour-
nalists perform in advancing the objectives of the first amendment. While it
has been established that the amendment provides more nearly absolute pro-
tection for news dissemination than for news gathering, 92 and clearly leaves
open ways for government to restrict access to information about hostage
situations, 93 direct governmental limits on the content of broadcast stories
about terrorist-hostage situations would seem to run into substantial first
amendment opposition. Certainly proposals like that of Pennsylvania Con-
gressman Joshua Eilberg, to make broadcast of a live threat to injury of
another person a crime, would have a difficult time if subjected to traditional
first amendment scrutiny. 94 Perhaps, however, there are more affirmative and
content neutral steps that government could take to improve coverage of
terrorist-hostage incidents.
First, there might be some gain in amending sec. 2(12) of the National
Labor Relations Act to permit a more elastic and multi-dimensional defini-
9 1McLeod & Hawley, Professionalization Among Newsmen, 41 JOURNALISM Q. 529, 535
(1964).
"
2See M. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA LAw 87-203 (1977) and cases
cited therein.
"In some respects the situation is analogous to the limits that judges may place on access to
criminal justice information to preserve a fair trial. Prior restraint is very difficult, but through
control over officers of the court, judges can limit access to news to assure a fair trial. See
Shepard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).94H.R. 1576, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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tion of "professional employee" - including a definition where not all
characteristics would have to be fulfilled before a worker would be classified
as a professional. Perhaps the law could adopt some of the relative and com-
parative measures of professionalism used by social scientists, in which case
journalists might be legally classifiable as professionals. The benefits of this
amendment relate to the effects of competition upon terrorist-hostage coverage.
In convention and panel discussions on the problem, and to a more limited
extent in the survey data, there is evidence that a "scoop" mentality may
make it harder to remain responsible in a terrorist-hostage coverge situation;
the "suspension of competition" was often suggested, but it was never explain-
ed how this might be explained to management. Under our system of broad-
cast regulation, where responsibility for operating the station legally rests in a
non-delegable fashion with licensees,95 it would be impossible for broadcast
journalists to achieve complete autonomy from often non-journalist trained
management. However, if classed as separate professional bargaining units,
news directors and others might choose to, and be able to, bargain effectively
with management for a greater role in deciding how to cover terrorism-
hostage situations. There might be more sharing of responsibility; the number
of news directors who lack authority to interrupt entertainment programming
for news might be reduced. Such an amendment to the NLRA would have
disadvantages-present broadcast unions usually want their bargaining units
to be as large and all-inclusive as possible, but it is an alternative to govern-
ment content control that might be profitably explored.
There are also alternatives that the Federal Communications Commission
might study. One was posed recently by the Commission when, as a result of
a remand from the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit in National Citizens
Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC,96 the FCC reopened its 1971-1974
Fairness Doctrine Inquiry to consider further an "Access is Fairness" proposal
originally advanced by the San Francisco Bay Area based Committee for
Open Media (COM). That proposal would have allowed broadcasters to opt
for a public access to the airwaves system in lieu of complying with the Com-
mission's traditional standards for the Fairness Doctrine.97 Under the proposal
as originally advanced, a broadcaster would be deemed in "presumptive com-
pliance" with the Fairness Doctrine if four conditions were met:
"See Agreements Between Broadcast Licensees and the Public, 35 RAn. REG. 2d 1177 (P &
F) (1975).
"41 RAD. REG. 2d 1311 (P & F) (1977).
"The fairness doctrine places two obligations on broadcasters: (1) to cover controversial
issues of public importance in their community and (2) to provide a reasonable opportunity for
the expression of opposing viewpoints on those issues. See generally The Handling of Public
Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications
Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1. 30 RAD. REG. 1261 (P & F) (1974). The doctrine has traditionally been view-
ed as intended to assure that the public is fully informed rather than as a protection of any right
for an individual or group to gain access to the airwaves to present their views. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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1) A licensee would set aside one hour per week for spot announcements
and lengthier programming which would be available for presentation of
messages by members of the public.
2) Half of this time would be allocated on a first-come, first served basis on
any topic whatsoever; the other half would be apportioned "on a represen-
tative spokesperson system."
3) Both parts of the allocation scheme would be "nondiscretionary as to
content with the licensee."
4) However, the broadcaster would still be required to ensure that spot
messages or other forms of response to "editorial advertisements" are broad-
cast. 98
On the basis of the Court remand, the Commission has opened an inquiry in-
to the COM proposal and alternatives. 9 Its pertinence to the terrorist-hostage
situations arise because of individual frustration with inability to get personal-
ly important opinions before a wide audience. While it is doubtful that the
very limited access alternative posed by the Committee for Open Media would
satisfy the highly politically motivated terrorists such as the Hanafi
muslims-Khaalis reportedly turned down an interview request from a 20,000
watt station in Texas by stating, "I don't talk to a radio station with less than
50,000 watts." 00-it might be possible that an individual like Kiritsis would
be satisfied with the access available under a COM-like proposal. The pro-
spect is, at least, one that could be examined within the context of the in-
quiry recently opened, and is a proposition upon which psychologists of ter-
rorism should already have useful data.
Of a more controversial nature, the FCC could amend its broadcast sta-
tion license renewal forms to require broadcasters to outline what plans they
have developed for handling terrorist-hostage situations. The Commission
already asks for similar information about news policy generally and about
children's programming plans. Usually the Commission makes no judgments
whatsoever about the quality of a broadcaster's plans in these areas, 01 but
even if it did, it could probably accept any plan drawn up reasonably and in
good faith. The advantage to the requirement would be that it might
stimulate the many broadcasters shown in the survey to be considering
guidelines to set their plans down in concrete form. Any such proposal would
be controversial, but is not without precedent as a way of insuring that
broadcasters plan for important aspects of their operation.
Finally, there are a variety of steps that governmental agencies other than
the FCC might take to improve police-media relations without directly
regulating content. As shown by former Washington, D.C. Police Chief
9 See note 96 supra, at 1335.
9 B.C. Docket No. 78-60, F.C.C. 78-108.
100Fenyvesi, Looking into the Muzzle of Terrorists, QUILL, July-Aug. 1977, at 16, 17.01See generally B. COLE & M. ORTHNGER, THE RELUCTANT REGULATORS (1978).
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Cullinane's proposals mentioned earlier, it is obvious that police media rela-
tions in the District of Columbia were severely strained following the Hanafi
Muslim siege. The District's new police chief, however, seems to be moving in
directions more to the liking of the press. He has proposed that police make
available to media representatives seminar training in how police handle ter-
rorist situations. 0 2 The proposal seems to be meeting with press support. An
impression gleaned from attending several of the journalist association panel
discussions of terrorism-hostage coverage is that the press does not believe it
knows all the answers to the questions associated with this kind of coverage.
An affirmative government plan to provide information and terrorist-hostage
training for journalists and police forces might improve the performance of
both semi-professional groups. Certainly that course of action is preferable to
continued reliance on unsupportable concepts of the professionalism of jour-
nalists and to direct content regulation of what is printed or broadcast about
terrorist-hostage incidents.
' 
0 Hostage Incident Training Proposed for Journalists, RTNDA COMMUNICATOR, Feb. 1978,
at 9.
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APPENDIX A
April 14, 1977
CBS NEWS ISSUES GUIDELINES FOR COVERAGE OF TERRORISTS
Production guidelines to be followed by CBS News in its "coverage of ter-
rorists" were issued April 7, 1977 by CBS News President Richard S. Salant.
These guidelines, now included as part of CBS News Standards, are as
follows:
Coverage of Terrorists
Because the facts and circumstances of each case vary, there can be no
specific self-executing rules for the handling of terrorist/hostage stories. CBS
News will continue to apply the normal test of news judgment and if, as so
often they are, these stories are newsworthy, we must continue to give them
coverage despite the dangers of "contagion." The disadvantages of suppres-
sion are, among things, (1) adversely affecting our credibility ("What else are
the news people keeping from us?"); (2) giving free rein to sensationalized
and erroneous word of mouth rumors; and (3) distorting our news judgments
for some extraneous judgmental purpose. These disadvantages compel us to
continue to provide coverage.
Nevertheless in providing for such coverage there must be thoughtful, cons-
cientious care and restraint. Obviously, the story should not be sensational-
ized beyond the actual fact of its being sensational. We should exercise par-
ticular care in how we treat the terrorist/kidnapper.
More specifically:
(1) An essential component of the story is the demands of the ter-
rorist/kidnapper and we must report those demands. But we
should avoid providing an excessive platform for the ter-
rorist/kidnapper. Thus, unless such demands are succinctly
stated and free of rhetoric and propaganda, it may be better
to paraphrase the demands instead of presenting them directly
through the voice or picture of the terrorist/kidnapper.
(2) Except in the most compelling circumstances, and then only
with the approval of the President of CBS News or in his
absence, the Senior Vice President of News, there should be no
live coverage of the terrorist/kidnapper since we may fall into
the trap of providing an unedited platform for him. (This does
not limit live on-the-spot reporting by CBS News reporters, but
care should be exercised to assure restraint and context.)
(3) News personel should be mindful of the probable need by the
authorities who are dealing with the terrorist for communica-
tion by telephone and hence should endeavor to ascertain,
wherever feasible, whether our own use of such lines would be
likely to interfere with the authorities' communications.
(4) Responsible CBS News representatives should endeavor to con-
tact experts dealing with the hostage situation to determine
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whether they have any guidance on such questions as
phraseology to be avoided, what kinds of questions or reports
might tend to exacerbate the situation, etc. Any such recom-
mendations by established authorities on the scene should be
carefully considered as guidance (but not as instruction) by
CBS News personnel.
(5) Local authorities should also be given the name or names of
CBS personnel whom they can contact should they have fur-
ther guidance or wish to deal with such delicate questions as a
newsman's call to the terrorists or other matters which might
interfere with authorities dealing with the terrorists.
(6) Guidelines affecting our coverage of civil disturbances are also
applicable here, especially those whidh relate to avoiding the
use of inflammatory catchwords or phrases, the reporting of
rumors, etc. As in the case of policy dealing with civil distur-
bances, in dealing with a hostage story reporters should obey
all police instructions but report immediately to their superiors
any such instructions that seem to be intended to manage or
suppress the news.
(7) Coverage of this kind of story should be in such overall balance
as to length, that it does not unduly crowd out other impor-
tant news of the hour/day.
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